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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The central point of this article is that there has been a constructive 
symbiosis between the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and 
Delaware’s corporation law, including its statutory component (the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, or DGCL) and its case law. We see three main 
elements of this symbiosis. 
First, each set of statutes has been informed by drafting and case-law 
experience generated under the other. 
Second, especially in recent years, Delaware’s legislature and judiciary have 
initiated important new elements of corporate law, subsequently adopted by the 
MBCA. 
Finally, the MBCA’s more deeply deliberative style has led to useful 
refinements of Delaware law. 
We interrupt this optimistic assessment at the outset, however, to point out 
that this symbiosis was—put gently—not visibly intended or perceived by the 
original shapers of the MBCA. They publicly derided the craftsmanship of the 
Delaware statute (“poor in sequence and loose in its provisions”)1 and stoutly 
asserted the superiority of their own work (“the organization of subject matter 
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 1. Whitney Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 BUS. LAW. 98, 100 (1956). 
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in the Model Act is the best that can be devised”).2 As they saw it, the MBCA 
was substantively superior to Delaware’s corporate law: with evident disdain, 
the MBCA drafters explained that “under the Delaware law charter 
amendments may be adopted upon the vote of a mere majority of the voting 
shares, and dividends may be declared and paid from earnings of the current or 
preceding year even though there may be large accumulated deficits from prior 
years.”3 In sum, Delaware’s statute was notably infradig: “[I]t was not the type 
of statute which the committee should present as a model for states intending to 
revise their laws,” and “not a single member of the committee thought it 
desirable to use the Delaware statute as a pattern.”4 
We loyal Delawareans do not intend to quibble with the boastful founding 
generation of the MBCA. True, we would not anoint the MBCA with the self-
congratulatory accolades that accompanied (promoted?) the publication of the 
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated in 1961 (“[A] magnificent work. I 
cannot remember when in recent years I have experienced such sheer pleasure 
from reading a legal text . . . .”).5 But the drafters of the original MBCA had 
reason to take pride in their work and to plausibly contend that the MBCA was 
better organized and more clearly drafted than the DGCL. We do not argue 
that the MBCA drafters did not have a case to make on that score, particularly 
as we concede that the current MBCA remains arguably a better model than 
the current DGCL for states lacking Delaware’s highly developed judicial 
system and corporate case law. 
As will be seen, however, our praise of the MBCA is not unalloyed: there 
have been occasions on which its hallmark precision has impaired its utility as a 
model, and its assertions of superiority have been overblown. But due to its 
unique form of authorship—through the work of a select committee of 
consistently conscientious, intelligent, and experienced corporate lawyers—the 
MBCA has made major contributions to U.S. corporate law and to the 
development of Delaware’s law itself. Delaware has contributed to the MBCA 
too, and these mutual contributions have had an unexpected but felicitous 
effect on U.S. corporate law. 
 
 2. Ray Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 BUS. 
LAW. vii, viii (1950). 
 3. Things evolve, of course: Delaware’s requirement of approval of a charter amendment by a 
majority of shares entitled to vote is more demanding than the MBCA’s current requirement of a 
majority of votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum is present, compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 242(b)(1) (2010), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(e) (2008), and the MBCA no longer concerns 
itself with the existence of earned surplus in determining whether a dividend is permissible, MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (2008). 
 4. Campbell, supra note 1. 
 5. Jule E. Stocker, Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 16 BUS. LAW. 748, 748 (1961). 
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At first glance, the origins of the MBCA and the modern DGCL seem 
unrelated. The statutes differ materially in language, structure, and approach. 
Moreover, the two statutes have quite distinct foundations: the modern DGCL 
springs from the 1967 revision to the DGCL (1967 Revision), and a 
comprehensive report prepared by Professor Ernest L. Folk III (Folk Report).6 
In contrast, the MBCA’s primary drafters were members of the Chicago bar, 
and the original MBCA (1950 MBCA) drew heavily upon the Illinois Business 
Corporation Act enacted in 1933.7 But a closer look reveals that the origins of 
the modern DGCL and the MBCA are intricately intertwined. 
The 1950 MBCA was essentially a restatement of the modern corporation 
statute.8 In the decades leading up to the publication of the 1950 MBCA, a 
number of states, including Illinois, modernized their corporation statutes.9 The 
bluster of Ray Garrett and other MBCA drafters in part may have been 
designed to hide an undeniable fact: The first generation corporation law 
revisions—statutes the MBCA drafters used as the grist for their restatement—
were, in large part, prompted by and modeled after the DGCL itself.10 They 
generally adopted the DGCL’s enabling approach to corporation law,11 but 
 
 6. See generally Dogsbodies of the DGCL: Revisiting Roles in the Landmark Achievement, DEL. 
LAW., Spring 2008, at 10. 
 7. Campbell, supra note 1, at 100 (stating that the MBCA’s “parent act is the Illinois Business 
Corporation Act enacted in 1933”); Garrett, supra note 2, at vii (stating that the Chicago members were 
the primary drafters of the MBCA). 
 8. Garrett, supra note 2, at viii (“[I]t is impossible to study and compare the statutes of all 48 
states and, because of their wide diversity, almost impossible to select a mere few for the purpose. Our 
Committee believes that by making a carefully planned modern pattern available, a formidable amount 
of labor and research on the part of local groups everywhere will be avoided.”). 
 9. See Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
573, 589 (2009) (“Beginning in the mid-1920s, a series of states, including those that dominated the 
nation’s industrial heartland, either substantially revised or completely replaced their existing 
corporation laws.”); Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
1291, 1299 (1952) (“In the past twenty-five years new corporation codes have been enacted in Idaho, 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, California, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington and Pennsylvania.”). 
 10. See Luce, supra note 9, at 1299 (noting that the DGCL had “particular influence” on the 
midcentury corporation statutes); Sveinbjorn Johnson, Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends in 
Corporation Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 631, 633 (1933) (stating that “in the majority of the cases [involving mid-
century revisions to a state’s corporation law] the Delaware act is the model which has been followed”). 
The 1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act that served as the MBCA’s model was no exception. See 
Johnson, supra (stating that the DGCL was, “in a general way, . . . the model for the new law of 
Illinois”); see also Henry Winthrop Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation 
Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 357 (1934) (explaining that the 1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act was 
“influenced to a greater or less extent by the Uniform Business Corporation Act and also by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law”). 
 11. The 1950 MBCA and its predecessors were also influenced by the well-developed Delaware 
common law that had addressed many of the interstitial issues left open by the DGCL, although the 
minimal legislative history and lack of annotations make it difficult to pinpoint the level of influence. 
The influence of Delaware common law can be seen, however, through comments such as those of Paul 
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included the types of organizational and drafting improvements one would 
expect from a statutory overhaul.12 Moreover, the various corporation-law 
revisions made certain policy judgments, incorporated local preferences, and 
reflected the boom or bust of the particular 1920s or 1930s period during which 
each statute was enacted.13 The original MBCA was the culmination of this first 
era of modern corporation statutes14 and restated its drafters’ views of the best 
of those statutes.15 
The MBCA’s role as a restatement of the modern corporation statutes—
combined with the barnstorming of the MBCA’s drafters16—increased the 
MBCA’s prominence and led to its use in thirteen states by the end of its first 
decade.17 The publication of the first annotated version of the MBCA in 1960—
an undertaking that took several years and a budget involving the current-day 
equivalent of $1.5 million18—cemented the MBCA’s role as a restater of modern 
corporation law.19 
The MBCA (and its blusterous drafters)20 fueled competition in corporation-
law revision, and by 1963, Delaware determined that it needed to revise its 
 
Carrington (one of the 1950 MBCA drafters) who observed that before Texas adopted the MBCA, 
Delaware “had the advantage over” Texas’s corporation law because “the statutes of Delaware and the 
decisions of Delaware courts were clear on many points on which Texas law was most uncertain or non-
existent.” Paul Carrington, A Corporation Code for Texas, 10 ARK. L. REV. 28, 29 (1955); see also 
ERNEST L. FOLK III, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 111, 117 (1967) [hereinafter 
FOLK REPORT] (report of Professor Folk citing to specific instances in which the MBCA had codified 
the Delaware case-law method of dealing with a particular issue), available at http://law.widener.edu/ 
LawLibrary/Research/OnlineResources/DelawareResources/DelawareCorporationLawRevisionComm
ittee.aspx.  
 12. See Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 421–23 (1952); see 
also Wilber G. Katz, A Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
177, 188 (1958) (suggesting the primary difference between the DGCL and the MBCA was that the 
MBCA’s improvements made it “vastly easier on the eyes”). 
 13. Garrett, supra note 12, at 421–23. 
 14. Wells, supra note 9, at 627 (“[The MBCA’s] issuance marked a continuation of the movement 
to modernize corporation laws, but also the end of that movement’s first era.”). 
 15. Garrett, supra note 2, at viii. 
 16. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 12 (encouraging Texas to adopt the MBCA); Campbell, supra 
note 1, at 110 (addressing the Utah Bar Association); see also Ernest L. Folk III, State Statutes: Their 
Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management Conduct, 31 BUS. LAW. 1031, 1054 (1976) (“The 
Model Act Committee was also given to proselytizing its own work.”). 
 17. See George D. Gibson, The Chairman’s Report to the Members of the Section, 15 BUS. LAW. 
247, 247 (1960) (“The present stature of the Model Business Corporation Act is further shown by its 
use, in whole or in part, in 13 States during the decade of the ’Fifties . . . .”). 
 18. See George C. Seward, Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 10 BUS. LAW. 65, 65 
(1955). 
 19. See Stocker, supra note 5, at 749 (“[T]his is a text that belongs in their libraries along with such 
books as the Restatements of the Law.”). 
 20. The comments of Floyd Wright, who drafted the Oklahoma and Florida corporation laws, 
suggest that the competition between draftsmen was perhaps even more vigorous than the competition 
between states of incorporation. See Floyd A. Wright, Current Developments in Statutory Corporation 
Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 1, 7 n.22 (1952) (quoting Garrett, supra note 2, at viii) (criticizing the MBCA 
drafters’ comment that the MBCA “has reached the ultimate and is ‘the best that can be devised.’”). 
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corporation law to remain competitive.21 The Delaware Corporation Law 
Revision Committee was formed, and the Revision Committee hired Professor 
Folk to undertake a comprehensive review of the DGCL.22 
Professor Folk in turn made the MBCA an important part of the Folk 
Report. The Folk Report is replete with references to the MBCA. Some of those 
references encouraged Delaware to adopt a particular modernization or policy 
approach taken by the MBCA.23 Other references suggested that the DGCL 
adopt the MBCA’s codification of certain principles that were already well-
developed in the Delaware case law.24 Still other references included the MBCA 
as an example of the road not taken in Delaware.25 
Yet, the MBCA’s influence on the 1967 Revision went beyond prompting 
the revision and being an integral part of the Folk Report’s survey of modern 
corporation law—the MBCA had a nontrivial role in shaping the text of the 
1967 Revision. Sam Arsht, one of the 1967 Revision’s primary draftsmen, 
observed that the drafters of the 1967 DGCL looked to the MBCA as one of 
their main sources of guidance, in addition to the Folk Report and the Revision 
Committee minutes.26 Furthermore, presaging the future, the drafters of the 
DGCL and MBCA worked hand-in-hand in drafting the statutory approach to 
the high-profile and contentious topic of the period—indemnification.27 
Although the MBCA’s influence on the 1967 Revision is perhaps 
underappreciated in modern times, the growing importance of the MBCA was 
meaningful enough during the revision process that one member of the Law 
 
 21. Act of Dec. 31, 1963, ch. 218, § 1, 54 Del. Laws 724, 724 (“WHEREAS, many states have 
enacted new corporation laws in recent years in an effort to compete with Delaware for corporate 
business”); see also Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee, 1st Meeting, at 1 
(Jan. 21, 1964) (“The Committee discussed the advisability of making a comprehensive study of the 
Delaware Corporation Law with the possibility of revising the law so as to make it comparable with 
recently enacted legislation in other states.”).  
 22. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14–17 
(1976). 
 23. See, e.g., FOLK REPORT, supra note 11, at 19 (suggesting the DGCL follow the MBCA’s default 
that a corporation is of perpetual duration unless otherwise stated in its charter); id. at 178–79 
(suggesting the DGCL follow the MBCA in allowing the corporation to prepare a restated charter 
rather than requiring the secretary of state to do so). 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 111 (suggesting the DGCL follow the MBCA in expressly codifying the 
Delaware case law requiring a corporation to hold an annual meeting to elect directors); id. at 117 
(suggesting the DGCL follow the MBCA in expressly codifying the Delaware case law requiring a 
statement of the purpose of any special meeting). 
 25. See, e.g., id. at 31 (citing the MBCA’s vesting of bylaw power exclusively with directors unless 
otherwise provided in the charter); id. at 117 (citing the MBCA’s requirement that certain derivative 
plaintiffs post security). 
 26. See Arsht, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that the drafting subcommittee looked “to the Folk 
Report, to the minutes of the Revision Committee and to other sources such as the Model Business 
Corporation Act for guidance”). 
 27. See, e.g., Orvel Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, 
Officers, and Others, 23 BUS. LAW. 95, 96 (1967) (describing the coordination of the Law Revision 
Committee and the Committee on Corporate Laws to produce nearly identical indemnification 
statutes). 
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Revision Committee argued that the DGCL should not adopt a particular 
MBCA provision “because we do not want to be a ‘me too’ State in view of the 
fact that in the past most of the other States had copied our laws and that we 
should be a leader not a follower.”28 The reality, of course, was that Delaware 
was far from a “me too” state in the 1967 Revision. Early in the revision 
process, the Law Revision Committee made a clear choice that it would 
“change [the DGCL] only where necessary, and also to keep as much of the 
original language as possible, especially where it had a heavy gloss of case 
law.”29 And many of the new provisions—such as those relating to stockholder 
meetings and stockholder inspection rights—were primarily codifications of the 
preexisting Delaware case law that more-modern statutes, including the 
MBCA, had built into their own statutory framework.30 
III 
DELAWARE AS INITIATOR 
Despite their common roots, a striking but ultimately unsurprising 
difference has emerged between the MBCA and Delaware corporate law in the 
last twenty-five years: with a few exceptions, and as demonstrated in the 
chronology below, Delaware has been the more prolific source of innovation in 
statutory corporate law.31 
1986: Responding to concern over the cost and availability of director- and 
officer-liability insurance, Delaware adopted section 102(b)(7), permitting 
charter provisions that eliminate director liability for monetary damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty except in limited circumstances. The MBCA adopted a 
similar provision four years later.32 
1990: Following a court opinion questioning their validity, Delaware 
amended section 212(c) to validate proxies conferred by electronic 
transmission; the MBCA followed six years later.33 
 
 28. Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee, 4th Meeting, at 1 (July 16, 
1964) (comments of Mr. David H. Jackman, President of the U.S. Corp. Co. of N.Y., regarding the 
adoption of the MBCA’s provision on the reservation of names). 
 29. Folk, supra note 16, at 1055 n.92. 
 30. See FOLK REPORT, supra note 11, at 111 (stockholder meetings); id. at 165 (stockholder 
inspection rights). 
 31. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, we have even more confidence that Delaware 
courts were a more prolific source of corporate-common-law innovation than the courts of other states. 
We do not attempt to address in any meaningful way the numerous case-law innovations during the last 
twenty-five years that helped, among other things, create a strong impetus for the election and 
empowerment of independent directors. 
 32. Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business 
Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737, 739 (2001). 
 33. Act of July 17, 1990, ch. 376, § 6, 67 Del. Laws 809, 809–10; Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA 
Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to 
Shareholder Meetings and Voting, 51 BUS. LAW. 209, 216–17 (1995); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA 
Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to 
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1990: Delaware added section 231 mandating the appointment of inspectors 
of election for public companies and specifying their duties. The MBCA 
followed six years later.34 
1983 and 1994: Delaware permitted charter provisions defining the rights of 
shares to be made dependent on facts ascertainable outside the charter itself; 
the MBCA followed in 2002.35 In this instance, the MBCA improved upon the 
Delaware version by extending the concept to any charter provision, and 
Delaware adopted that MBCA refinement in 2004.36 
1998 (for mergers) and 2003 (for other matters approved by the board of 
directors and presented to stockholders for a vote): Delaware adopted so-called 
“force the vote” statutes authorizing a commitment to present a matter for a 
stockholder vote even if the board of directors subsequently determines that the 
matter is no longer advisable.37 The MBCA adopted this innovation in 2008.38 
2002: Delaware provided for “householding” of notices to stockholders; the 
MBCA followed four years later.39 
2009: DGCL amendments validated bylaws requiring the corporation to 
include stockholder nominees in the company’s proxy materials or to reimburse 
stockholder proxy-solicitation expenses.40 At the same time, Delaware 
 
Shareholder Meetings and Voting, 52 BUS. LAW. 225, 227 (1996) (adopting amendments to section 
7.22). 
 34. Act of July 17, 1990, ch. 376, § 9, 67 Del. Laws 810–11; Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA 
Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to 
Shareholder Meetings and Voting, 51 BUS. LAW. 209, 220–21 (1995); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA 
Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to 
Shareholder Meetings and Voting, 52 BUS. LAW. 225, 227 (1996) (adopting section 7.29). 
 35. Act of July 8, 1983, ch. 112, § 8, 64 Del. Laws 285, 286; Act of June 27, 1994, ch. 264, § 1, 69 Del. 
Laws 524, 524; Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act Pertaining to Shares and References in Documents to Extrinsic Facts, 57 BUS. LAW. 
355, 356 (2001); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act Pertaining to Shares and References in Documents to Extrinsic Facts, 57 BUS. LAW. 
1665, 1665 (2002) (adopting amendments to sections 1.20, 2.02, and 6.01). 
 36. Act of July 6, 2004, ch. 326, § 1, 74 Del. Laws 813, 813 (adding section 102(d)). 
 37. Act of June 29, 1998, ch. 338, § 44, 71 Del. Laws 870, 872 (amending section 251(c)); Act of 
June 30, 2003, ch. 84, § 3, 74 Del. Laws 214, 214 (adding section 146).  
 38. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Force the Vote Amendments to Chapter 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 511, 511–12 (2008); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model 
Business Corporation Act—Amendment to Section 6.24, Adoption of Section 8.26 (“Force the Vote”) 
and Related Amendments to Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14, 63 BUS. LAW. 1275, 1275–76 (2008) 
(adopting section 8.26 and related amendments). 
 39. Act of June 20, 2002, ch. 298, § 9, 73 Del. Laws 786, 786–87 (adopting section 233); Comm. on 
Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—
Proposed Amendments to Chapters 1, 7, and 14 with Conforming Amendments to Related Provisions of 
the Act, 60 BUS. LAW. 1577, 1578 (2005); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, 
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Chapters 1, 7, and 14 with 
Conforming Amendments to Related Provisions of the Act, 61 BUS. LAW. 1183, 1183–84 (2006) 
(adopting section 1.44). The MBCA also at that time adopted an amendment permitting shareholder 
action by less than unanimous consent, a feature of Delaware law since 1967. 
 40. Act of April 10, 2009, ch. 14, §§ 1–2, 77 Del. Laws (adopting sections 112 to 113). The DGCL 
amendments followed the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees 
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permitted companies to separate record dates for notice of and voting at 
stockholder meetings.41 With unusual expedition, the MBCA adopted similar 
provisions later that year.42 
The MBCA’s adoption of Delaware’s corporate-law innovations has 
extended as well to encompass innovations by the Delaware courts: 
1989: The MBCA’s provisions governing shareholder derivative suits were 
thoroughly overhauled.43 This overhaul included innovations of its own,44 but it 
drew heavily on Delaware case law,45 and the accompanying official comment 
recognized that the MBCA had theretofore been silent on some important 
issues that courts in Delaware and elsewhere had already been required to 
address.46 
1996: The widely cited Caremark decision47 analyzed the circumstances in 
which directors might be held personally liable for failures to exercise sufficient 
oversight over corporate affairs. That decision articulated a standard of liability 
keyed to whether the plaintiff demonstrates “a sustained or systematic failure of 
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists.”48 Two years later, the same 
 
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). The amendments codified existing law and arguably obviated 
any claim that the fiduciary out concept—which before AFSCME had been applied by Delaware courts 
only to constrain director rather than stockholder action—blocks stockholders from adopting bylaws on 
proxy access and proxy-expense reimbursement.  
 41. Act of April 10, 2009, ch. 14, § 5, 77 Del. Laws (amending section 213(a)).  
 42. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Shareholder Voting Provisions Authorizing Remote 
Participation in Shareholder Meetings and Bifurcated Record Dates, 65 BUS. LAW. 153, 156–57 (2009); 
Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation 
Act—Proposed Shareholder Proxy Access Amendments to Chapters 2 and 10, 64 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1157–
59 (2009); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Shareholder Proxy Access Amendments to Chapters 2 and 10, 65 BUS. 
LAW. 1105, 1106–08 (2010); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the 
Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Shareholder Voting Provisions 
Authorizing Remote Participation in Shareholder Meetings and Bifurcated Record Dates, 65 BUS. LAW. 
1119, 1121–23 (2010). 
 43. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 45 BUS. LAW. 1241, 1241–42 
(1990) [hereinafter Derivative Proceedings]. 
 44. We discuss in part IV below, somewhat critically, the notable innovation of the universal 
demand requirement in section 7.42 of the MBCA. 
 45. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 32, at 745 (describing section 7.44(c) of the MBCA as codifying 
Delaware law regarding standards of director independence); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 7.44 
cmt. at 7-347 (2008) (noting that subsections (d) and (e) of section 7.44 “follow the first Aronson [v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)] standard in allocating the burden of proof depending on whether the 
majority of the board is independent”). 
 46. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 cmt. at 7-341 to -342 (2008) (“The prior version of the 
Model Act did not expressly provide what happens when a board of directors properly rejects a 
demand to bring an action . . . [and] was also silent on the effect of a determination by a special 
litigation committee of independent directors that a previously commenced derivative action can be 
dismissed.”). 
 47. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–71 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 48. Id. at 971. 
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adjective Caremark used—“sustained”—to describe the kind of inattention 
necessary for a finding of director liability was introduced into the MBCA for 
the same purpose.49 
2004: The decision in Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc. reaffirmed the equitable 
(that is, corporate common law) duty under Delaware law to provide financial 
information to minority shareholders in a squeeze-out merger in order to 
enable them to determine whether to seek appraisal of their shares.50 In 2006, 
the MBCA was amended to recognize the duty articulated in Gilliland—
acknowledging Gilliland in the accompanying official comment—and to bring 
some predictability to the scope of the information to be provided.51  
What might account for Delaware’s relatively greater level of innovation 
and resulting influence on the MBCA?52 Surely not the native creativity or 
breadth of practice experience of the drafters of its corporate statute: although 
Delawareans have been reasonably well represented on the Committee on 
Corporate Laws, the collective expertise of the Committee’s members is 
undoubtedly at least as formidable as that of their Delaware counterparts, the 
Council of the Delaware State Bar Association’s Corporation Law Section. The 
better explanation involves institutional position and structure. Delaware’s 
courts and legislative drafters routinely confront problems and uncertainties in 
the administration of the DGCL that cannot, consistent with Delaware’s 
corporate-law mission, be tolerated in the long run.53 Delaware must innovate—
 
 49. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Amendments Pertaining to Electronic Filings/Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Liability for Directors, 53 BUS. LAW. 157, 172 (1997); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. 
Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining to the Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Liability for Directors—Final Adoption, 53 BUS. LAW. 813, 813 (1998) (adopting section 
8.31, particularly subsection (a)(2)(iv)). 
 50. Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2004). Gilliland followed a long line of 
Delaware cases on this point. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114 (Del. 1992); 
Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 542 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 51. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments Relating to Chapters 8 and 13, 61 BUS. LAW. 1191, 1193 
(2006); Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments Relating to Chapters 8 and 13, 62 BUS. LAW. 1061, 1062 
(2007) (adding new paragraphs (d) and (e) to section 13.20). 
 52. The MBCA has not been barren of innovation itself, and the mere fact that Delaware has not 
adopted some of the MBCA’s innovations does not negate their utility. In particular, the MBCA 
amendments adopted in 1999 reflected great creativity and insight. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, 
ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Appraisal Rights, 54 BUS. 
LAW. 209, 210–51 (1998) (amending section 13.02 to rationalize the availability of appraisal rights); 
Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation 
Act—Fundamental Changes, 54 BUS. LAW. 685, 687–89, 700, 708–09 (1999) [hereinafter Fundamental 
Changes] (amending sections 6.21, 10.03, 11.04(e), 12.02(e), and 14.02(e) to create a uniform rule 
governing the shareholder vote required to approve fundamental corporate changes); Comm. on 
Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining 
to Appraisal Rights and to Fundamental Changes—Final Adoption, 55 BUS. LAW. 405, 406 (1999) 
(amending section 12.02 to clarify when shareholders are entitled to vote on sales of corporate assets). 
 53. Delaware’s reputation as a desirable jurisdiction for incorporation depends in significant part 
on its ability to keep its corporate statute as up to date as possible in addressing emerging questions of 
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within narrow bounds, to be sure—to maintain its preeminence. The Council, 
similar to the Committee on Corporate Laws, receives input from a national 
constituency about areas for statutory improvement; but the Council acts faster 
to address new issues and proposed changes.54 In contrast, the MBCA is under 
no such pressure to innovate. The MBCA’s drawn-out, formal process (three 
formal “readings” and publication of an exposure draft following the second 
reading)55 is not conducive to nimble adaptation, but promotes the clarity of 
drafting and internal coherence suitable to a model statute. 
IV 
MBCA AS REFINER 
In at least some circumstances, however, the MBCA’s deliberative process 
generates refinements that improve on and influence Delaware law. These 
refinements generally reflect the MBCA’s propensity to build bright-line rules 
into the statute in an attempt to create greater certainty.56 Often, an MBCA 
refinement signals to the Delaware judiciary that the Delaware common law 
needs to be refined. Less frequently, given Delaware’s inclination to trust the 
common-law process, an MBCA refinement triggers statutory reform. 
One example of the positive influence of MBCA refinements is the 
MBCA’s refinement of the statutory scheme governing asset dispositions. 
Under section 271 of the DGCL, stockholder approval is required for a sale of 
“all or substantially all of [a corporation’s] property or assets.” The seminal 
Delaware case interpreting this phrase57 added arguably needless uncertainty by 
requiring an evaluation of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the 
transaction and closely examining whether a transaction involving only twenty-
six percent and forty-one percent of a corporation’s total and net assets 
required a stockholder vote.58 Such case law left Delaware corporations 
wondering whether stockholder approval was required for transactions that 
were seemingly far outside the statute’s reach under any plain reading of 
“substantially all.” 
 
corporate law. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 240 (1985). 
 54. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1756–57 (2006) (discussing the Council process and the role of non-
Delawareans). 
 55. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. intro. at xxviii–xxix (2008) (describing the composition and 
procedures of the Committee on Corporate Laws). 
 56. See, e.g., Goldman & Dooley, supra note 32, at 764–66 (discussing the MBCA’s tendency 
toward bright-line rules). 
 57. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1974). 
 58. See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 376–79 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing 
Gimbel); see also In re Nantucket Island Assocs. Ltd. P’ship Unitholders Litig., 810 A.2d 351, 369–72 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the “extreme caution” practitioners had to take in planning asset sales because 
Gimbel had departed so starkly from the “substantially all” language of section 271). 
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When the Delaware courts have addressed a topic, even in a less than 
optimal way, the Delaware Council tends to be reluctant to codify a different 
approach. There are two reasons for that reluctance. First and foremost, many 
topics addressed by corporate common law are difficult ones that have been left 
for development by the case-by-case common-law method for good reason. 
Although that method has costs, it allows for low-cost learning and it does not 
threaten to rigidify a bright-line approach that, given the fallibility of humans, 
might be wrong.59 Second, there is some reluctance on the part of the Council to 
express disagreement with the courts by taking action that could be seen as 
statutorily overruling a judicial decision.60 
By contrast, the Committee on Corporate Laws has traditionally viewed as 
one of its core functions the proposal of more effective statutory approaches to 
areas of corporate practice that have been less adroitly addressed by the 
common-law technique. This is precisely what happened when the Committee 
considered revisions to the MBCA’s provisions regarding asset dispositions. 
The Committee created a task force to review the issue and ultimately adopted 
new statutory language in 1999.61 A primary innovation of the 1999 amendments 
was to refine the asset-disposition test to focus on what the corporation 
retained, rather than what it sold. Thus, the relevant test became whether the 
corporation retained a “significant continuing business activity.”62 The 1999 
amendments also added much needed clarity by creating a statutory safe 
harbor63 and expressly establishing that assets of consolidated subsidiaries were 
deemed assets of their parent corporation for purposes of the asset-disposition 
test.64 
When the MBCA is revised to address a topic covered by Delaware 
common law, those revisions can provide logical support to Delaware judges 
who perceive that the existing common-law approach to the topic could use 
improvement. This is precisely what happened in 2004 when the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, in part influenced by the MBCA’s “valuable perspective on 
§ 271,”65 refocused the common law on a more faithful reading of section 271’s 
“substantially all” requirement.66 Moreover, the court cited the MBCA’s 
provision on the treatment of subsidiaries for purposes of its asset-disposition 
 
 59. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an 
Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in 
the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1268–72 (2001). 
 60. See Hamermesh, supra note 54, at 1771 n.98, 1777–81. 
 61. See Fundamental Changes, supra note 52, at 685–86. 
 62. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (2008). 
 63. Id. (making clear that stockholder approval is not required if the corporation retains a business 
activity that represented twenty-five percent of net assets at the end of the last fiscal year and twenty-
five percent of either income or revenue for that fiscal year). 
 64. Id. § 12.02(h). 
 65. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 386 n.79 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 66. See id. at 345 (“Has the judiciary transmogrified the words ‘substantially all’ in § 271 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law into the words ‘approximately half’?”). 
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test in discussing the somewhat-contradictory Delaware case law on that point.67 
Inspired by Hollinger (and ultimately by the MBCA’s clarity on the point), 
Delaware amended section 271 to clarify that assets of a corporation for 
purposes of that statute include the assets of its wholly owned subsidiaries.68  
Hollinger is not the only example of how the MBCA’s deliberative, 
precision-focused amendments have influenced Delaware law: others include 
refining the scope of section 145(c)’s mandatory indemnification to exclude 
employees and agents,69 and expanding the permitted use of facts-ascertainable 
provisions in corporate charters.70 
On occasion, the MBCA’s refinements achieve a false, or at least dubious, 
clarity. One example is the MBCA’s universal demand requirement for 
derivative litigation.71 Attempting to improve upon Delaware’s practice, the 
MBCA’s drafters stated that this requirement “will eliminate the often 
excessive time and expense for both litigants and the court in litigating the 
question whether demand is required.”72 This is likely wishful thinking: The 
same issues litigated in demand futility cases (for example, director 
disinterestedness and independence) must still be litigated, based on pleadings 
alone, when the corporation moves to dismiss the derivative proceeding.73 A 
second example is the MBCA’s Herculean attempt74 to create a comprehensive, 
bright-line rule approach to director-conflict transactions. Despite its intense 
detail, the approach ultimately breaks down in practice and requires the use of 
judicial discretion in reviewing conflict transactions.75 
On balance, however, the MBCA and Delaware are good partners in a 
longstanding symbiotic relationship, as perhaps most vividly illustrated by their 
recent handling of the issue of majority voting in the election of directors. In 
 
 67. Id. at 373 n.35. 
 68. Act of May 17, 2005, ch. 30, § 28, 75 Del. Laws 21, 24 (adding subsection 271(c)). 
 69. See Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 17350, 2000 WL 286722, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 
2000) (discussing how Delaware followed the MBCA’s lead in amending its mandatory-indemnification 
provision to exclude employees and agents). 
 70. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 71. Derivative Proceedings, supra note 43, at 1241–42; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 
(2008). 
 72. Derivative Proceedings, supra note 43, at 1241–42. 
 73. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(a), (c), (d) (2008); see also Robert Thompson, Delaware’s 
Disclosure: Moving the Line on Federal–State Corporate Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 174 
(“The result [of the MBCA’s universal demand requirement] is to move the point of judicial review a 
bit deeper into the litigation, but not necessarily to produce a more determinate result.”); Kenneth B. 
Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 449 (2008) (“[I]n those cases where the 
board or an SLC has recommended dismissal, courts applying the MBCA test generally have taken a 
rigorous approach to assessing the directors’ independence and good faith, as well as the 
reasonableness of their investigation.”). 
 74. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.63 (2008). 
 75. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to 
Professors Carney and Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 95, 120 (“An analysis of the case law, however, suggests that the MBCA’s bright-line rules [on 
director conflict transactions] are not a panacea for the pains of litigation.”). 
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that instance, the MBCA’s formal process benefited Delaware and corporate 
law generally by educating key constituencies (including Delaware’s corporate 
bar) and building national consensus. Responding to calls for mandatory 
majority voting, the Committee on Corporate Laws formed a task force (co-
chaired by Delaware lawyer A. Gilchrist Sparks III, now chair of the 
Committee on Corporate Laws); issued a “discussion paper” on the subject in 
June 2005, inviting comments; published a Preliminary Report and Annex in 
January 2006, inviting further comments; published draft amendments upon 
“second reading” in March 2006, yet again inviting comments; and adopted the 
amendments in June 2006.76 While the MBCA drafters were doing all this, 
Delaware’s drafters—closely following the MBCA’s progress—were able to 
take a quieter and more limited approach, which was adopted into law in 
August 2006.77 Judged by adoptions alone, the MBCA’s approach has thus far 
had very limited success: only a few states have adopted its majority-voting 
approach,78 while hundreds or perhaps even thousands of companies have taken 
advantage of Delaware’s more open-ended solution.79 But using adoptions as a 
measure of success fails to give the MBCA its due: It is questionable whether 
Delaware’s approach would have yielded such dramatic change without the 
public education generated by the efforts of the MBCA’s drafters. 
 
 76. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Discussion Paper on Voting by 
Shareholders for the Election of Directors 17–18 (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
dch/more.cfm?com=CL270000&mod=10; Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, 
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Chapter 8 and 10 Relating 
to Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors, 61 BUS. LAW. 399, 400–01 (2005); COMM. ON 
CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE 
LAWS ON VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 1–2 (Mar. 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/dch/more.cfm?com=CL270000&mod=10; Comm. on Corporate 
Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments to 
Chapter 7 and Related Provisions Relating to Shareholder Action Without a Meeting, Chapters 8 and 10 
Relating to Shareholder Voting for the Election of Directors, and Chapter 13 Relating to Appraisal and 
Other Remedies for Fundamental Transactions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1427, 1427–28 (2006). 
 77. Unlike former section 7.28(a) of the MBCA, section 216 of the DGCL had long permitted the 
bylaws—and thus the stockholders, unilaterally—to vary the default plurality-vote standard. Thus, 
while the MBCA’s 2006 amendments afforded shareholders only a limited new opening to adopt a 
majority-vote rule, the field was already wide open in Delaware, and Delaware’s 2006 amendments 
merely established (1) the efficacy of an advance director resignation keyed to the shareholder vote on 
election, and (2) the prohibition against board amendment of a shareholder-adopted majority-vote 
bylaw. 
 78. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-809 (2009); IND. CODE § 23-1-39-4 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 16-10a-1023 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.205 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1023 (2010). 
Other MBCA states have adopted less-cumbersome provisions that are more akin to the Delaware 
approach. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0728 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-728 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-669 (2007). 
 79. More than seventy percent of S&P 500 companies have adopted a majority-vote standard. See 
Protecting Shareholders and Restoring Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (statement of John J. Castellani, President, The Bus. Roundtable). 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
The MBCA and Delaware corporate law remain usefully distinct. Driven by 
circumstance, Delaware innovates; driven by its institutional character, the 
MBCA restates, refines, and clarifies. The feedback loop between the two 
bodies of law serves them both well, in ways that their original architects surely 
never foresaw. 
 
